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Philosophy “rock star” Slavoj Zizek takes exception to those who smugly
proclaim that Western culture has entered a post-ideological age. In such an age,
people no longer hold to deep beliefs about religion or history or politics. They
do not need Hegel or Jesus Christ, Moses or Marx. They have become more
pragmatic creatures who make rational choices based on their self-interest—
whether that be economic or psychological, political or sexual. They are freed
from ultimately foundationless doctrines such as Christianity or Marxism.
Zizek tells the story of a man whose wife died of cancer rather suddenly.
The man dealt remarkably well with her passing. But his friends noticed that
whenever he talked about his wife he held a hamster in his hands—his wife’s
beloved pet. Months later the hamster died, the man had an emotional
breakdown, and he had to be hospitalized for severe depression. In this
philosophical parable, the death of the wife is the death of ideologies and the
hamster is the fetish that allows people to persevere in the absence of ideologies.
So to the post-ideologist, Zizek asks “where is your hamster—the fetish which enables
you to (pretend to) accept reality ‘the way it is’?” (Zizek, “Afterword,” 252).
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I want to argue that it is in popular culture that we find an array of
fetishistic objects that people desire in a post-ideological Western culture. From
television shows to Barbies, from movies to sports teams, people find a fetish that
serves to fill the void left by the absence of religious and political ideology.
Despite the therapeutic benefits, however, my claim is that, in a viciously circular
manner, popular culture fetishes depend upon and promote a kind of self that is
feeble and diminished—a kind of self that we would be wise to avoid.
In order to understand how fetishes work, it is instructive to look at not
only Zizek’s account, but Karl Marx’s as well. Marx describes a commodity as
“an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some
sort or another” (Marx, 437). Commodities have a mystical or mysterious
character to them. Produced by human beings, they take on a life of their own—
detached from the hands that make them. They become the locus of social
relations, to the extent that the consumers and the producers are only in a
relationship through the commodity itself. Marx compares commodities to the
gods of the religious world.
In that [religious] world the productions of the
human brain appear as independent beings endowed
with life, and entering into relation both with one
another and the human race. So it is in the world of
commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I
call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products
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of labour, so soon as they are produced as
commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from
the production of commodities. (Marx, 447)
Thus, the attachment to or even craving of commodities is fetishism. The
commodities that we desire fulfill our needs “of some sort or another.” While
some of these needs may be biological, commodity fetishism speaks more to
deeper psychological or existential needs such as human relations and meaning.
It speaks in particular to those needs that arise in response to traumatic change,
such as, today, the fall of ideological structures. These needs are even more
powerful than those of biology, and they explain the powerful draw that
commodities have on us. This is the focus of the work of someone like Zizek,
drawing on the psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan as well as Marxist theory.
Zizek makes a distinction between a symptom and a fetish. Take again the
case of the death of a loved one:
in the case of a symptom, I “repress” this death, I try
not to think about it, but the repressed trauma returns
in the symptom; in the case of a fetish, on the
contrary, I “rationally” fully accept this death, and yet
I cling to the fetish, to some feature that embodies for
me the disavowal of this death. In this sense, a fetish
can play a very constructive role in allowing us to
cope with the harsh reality: fetishists are not dreamers
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lost in their private worlds, they are thoroughly
“realists,” able to accept the way things effectively
are—since they have their fetish to which they can
cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality.
(Zizek, On Belief, 13-14)
The man whose wife died could repress his sadness and try not to think
about her. He could throw himself, for example, into his work—perhaps even in
an obsessive manner. Here his repressed mourning shows itself in his symptom,
in his obsessive dedication to his job. On the other hand, he might rationally
accept the death and talk about it freely—but only with the aid of the fetish. In
this case, the hamster helps him to cope with the burden of the reality that he
does not repress but that he also cannot accept at face value. As Zizek concludes,
“a fetish is the embodiment of the lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable
truth. . . . In this sense, a fetish can play a very constructive role of allowing us to
cope with harsh reality” (Zizek, Universal, 253).
Zizek’s work abounds with examples of fetishes in Western culture.
Money is a good one. He writes that “a bourgeois subject knows very well that
there is nothing magic about money, that money is just an object which stands
for a set of social relations, but he nevertheless acts in real life as if he believed
that money is a magical thing” (Zizek, Universal, 254-255). Western Buddhism is
often a target for Zizek. While practitioners go about their daily business
immersed in capitalist endeavors, they can act as if they are detached from it
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(Zizek, Universal, 254). Thus, they can believe themselves to be free of that
system’s manipulations and injustices while knowing they are not.1
The commodities of popular culture are fetishistic as well. While we know
that they are mostly trash and meaningless, we act as if they are important and
increasingly structure our lives around them—be it the ritualistic viewing of our
favorite weekly television show or the obsessive fascination with our celebrities
or our potentially unhealthy identification with our chosen sports team.
On the issue of commodity fetishism, Zizek’s work is consistent with that
of thinkers who came out of the Frankfurt School, itself shaped by the Marxist
tradition. Along with his frequent collaborator Max Horkheimer, Theodor
Adorno critiqued the “culture industry” or “mass culture.” He writes, “Before
the theological caprices of commodities, the consumers become temple slaves.
Those who sacrifice themselves nowhere else can do so here, and here they are
fully betrayed” (Adorno, 39). They are betrayed because the commodities never
satisfy their needs, at least not enough or for long enough. Adorno, in his
typically bleak manner, concludes: “Without admitting it they [the consumers of
commodities] sense that their lives would be completely intolerable as soon as
they no longer clung to satisfactions which are none at all” (Adorno, 103). For
Zizek, the satisfactions are “none at all” because, like Coca-Cola, they never

Or take democracy. As with any symbolic order (the “Big Other” for Zizek), democracy entails
the violent imposition of itself on the population and thus always fails to meet its ideal. Thus,
Zizek concludes that “I know very well (that the democratic form is just a form spoiled by stains of
‘pathological’ imbalance), but just the same (I act as if democracy were possible)” (Zizek, Looking
Awry, 168).

1
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really satisfy us. He argues that Coke’s “strange taste does not seem to provide
any particular satisfaction; it is not directly pleasing and endearing; however, it
is precisely as such, as transcending any immediate use-value (unlike water, beer
or wine, which definitely do quench our thirst or produce the desired effect of
satisfied calm), that Coke functions as the direct embodiment of ‘it’: of the pure
surplus of enjoyment over standard satisfactions, of the mysterious and elusive X
we are all after in our compulsive consumption of merchandise” (Zizek, Fragile,
22). Whether or not we agree with this negative assessment of Coke, Zizek’s
point is clear: consumption never ultimately satisfies us. As he concludes, “every
satisfaction opens up a gap of ‘I want more!’” (Zizek, Fragile, 22). But the problem
is not simply that we can never consume enough, it is that there is a fundamental
lack in all consumption. It is not that I cannot drink enough Cokes. Whether I
drink 10 or 10,000, my consumption of each one is an experience of lack—of the
failure of the commodity to satisfy my real need.2
So what can we take from Marx and Zizek? First, from Marx we must
recognize that fetishes (in this case in regard to commodities) represent or
embody social relations, but in an alienated way. We are not directly in
relationships with others, for these relationships only are mediated through
commodities. And from Zizek we see that fetishes help us to cope with a reality
that we do not repress, but with which we only can cope by virtue of the fetish.

This “real need” is a consequence of what Zizek, borrowing from Lacan, calls the “Real.” This
“Real” is the untouchable and unknowable void—like a black hole in space—around which our
psychic life revolves. Like a black hole, we cannot “see” the Real, but only witness its effects.
2
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So if fetishes are a sign of alienation from others, from social relations; and they
are a sign of alienation from reality, because we fundamentally cannot cope with
reality directly but only through fetishistic mediation; and if popular culture can
be seen as an array of fetishistic objects and phenomena; then popular culture in
the end is dependent on a socially-isolated and psychologically-impaired self for
its success and in its standard mode of operation popular culture promotes such a
self. Stated another and shorter way, popular culture depends upon and
promotes the postmodern self.
This is the kind of self Alasdair MacIntyre describes and criticizes.
Throughout much of his career, but particularly in his work After Virtue, first
published in 1981, MacIntyre makes a compelling argument that moral life is not
a matter of rational assent to a set of transcendental philosophical or logical rules
of conduct. Instead, moral life is grounded in communities that have a certain
history and that are bound to a certain tradition or traditions that provide the
justification for the moral life lived in those communities. This does not mean
that there is no place for ethical reflection, but that community, history, and
tradition precede that reflection and only on the foundation of that community,
history, and tradition will the judgments and the actions from that reflection be
justified. The broader criticism here is of the stereotypical, liberal rational being
or postmodern self. The broader criticism is of the self defined by its rational
capabilities rather than by the intricate web of relationships that form a
substantive understanding of the self—a web that includes other selves in the
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community, the history of that community, and the tradition that provides
myths, legends, rituals and so much more that explain what it means to be in this
intricate web. The broader criticism is of what I will call the “naked self.”
MacIntyre’s project is both descriptive and prescriptive. He is describing
the nature of the self. He also is describing what he takes to be changes in our
understanding of the self, changes that can be traced philosophically back to
Kant’s transcendental arguments of the 18th century but that have had a broader
and more pervasive impact among 20th century liberal democracies in the West—
democracies that fundamentally presuppose the naked self. But MacIntyre is also
prescribing a remedy to what he takes to be a contemporary social disease, and
his remedy is to reinvigorate our traditions (his tradition of choice is Catholicism,
though other traditions might be equally worthwhile) as sites where people can
once again be whole selves (or, one might say, “clothed selves”).3
Of course, there are some advantages to the naked self—especially in a
pluralistic society. If we are all clothed selves, divided into separate
communities, histories, and traditions, how can we form one society or one
nation? Won’t these divisions simply lead to conflict? Haven’t they done so
throughout human history? Do we really want a bunch of conflicting moral

3 Hermeneutically speaking, there are no purely naked selves. We always already are caught up
in community, history, and tradition. Here MacIntyre is consistent with a significant strand of
20th century philosophy. In particular I am thinking of the kind of self described by Martin
Heidegger’s notion of our “thrownness” or Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of the “effective history”
and the key role of “tradition” or even Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of the “narrative self.” Like
MacIntyre, such philosophers reject the naked self of postmodern liberal democracies—the kind
of self we are left with in a post-ideological age.
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codes instead of one morality to which we can all rationally assent? MacIntyre is
aware of these problems. But, for MacIntyre, the costs of the naked self (moral
ambiguity, anxiety concerning life’s purposes, loss of meaning, etc.) far outweigh
the advantages.
MacIntyre’s analysis can be applied to the self of popular culture. Popular
culture treats the self not as grounded in a rich tradition that provides meaning
and purpose, but as groundless—capable of being swayed and manipulated to
consume this product or that form of entertainment. The popular culture self is
conceived as one that has certain desires or cravings that are not bound to a
community, history, or tradition.4 We come into the world as naked (literally and
figuratively) individual consumers and we die that way.5

4 As a colleague has pointed out to me, a particularly devilish problem for MacIntyre is that our
traditions already have been mediated or re-figured through popular culture. In this sense, not
only are we “always already” within community, history, and tradition, we “always already” are
within those through popular culture. Direct access to them is impossible.
5 The consumer self that is stripped of connections with community, tradition, and history is
infinitely pliable and manipulated by producers of commodities and culture. And as citizens
come to see themselves primarily as consumers (even if only unconsciously), they increasing put
their freedom at risk in light of the manipulation of the popular culture industry. Even worse,
citizens increasingly recognize the ways in which they are manipulated yet willingly cede their
freedom in this regard. Adorno argues that the “dream industry [culture industry] does not so
much fabricate the dreams of the customers as introduce the dreams of the suppliers among the
people” (Adorno, 93). This is a powerful critique, but its effect is minimal because nobody seems
to care that their dreams (read “wants” or “desires”) are not their own but are the dreams of
commodity producers. As Adorno affirms, “The customer is not king, as the culture industry
would have us believe, not its subject but its object” (Adorno, 99). It is in this sense that Adorno
argues that the culture industry is not a consequence of human desires, it does not conform itself
to the wants of the consumer, rather it conforms the consumer to itself. Adorno concludes that
“the culture industry is not the art of the consumer but rather the projection of the will of those in
control onto their victims” (185). Jean Baudrillard puts forth a similar claim. “It has never been so
clear that the content—here, culture, elsewhere, information or commodities—is nothing but the
phantom support for the operation of the medium itself,” he argues, “whose function is always to
induce mass, to produce a homogeneous human and mental flux” (Baudrillard, 67). The
consequences for the individual are grave. Popular culture creates a world of simulacra and
simulations that prevents us from experiencing any real meaning in events or relationships. Thus,
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The naked selves of American culture are easy pickings for businesses and
corporations that provide consumer services and goods. The strategy of “market
segmentation” both draws upon individual preference and further isolates
individuals from what we might call their “natural” communities—those based
on neighborhood geography, school districts, etc. On the one hand, companies
utilizing market segmentation draw upon similarities within a particular group
and offer products to its specific needs or wants. On the other hand, however,
such a strategy accentuates dividing lines among the population, whether along
the lines of race, age, class, ethnicity, or more. It also cuts across “natural”
communities, appealing to consumers from one end of the country to the other.
As Lizabeth Cohen concludes in her book A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of
Mass Consumption in Postwar America, market segmentation strengthened “the
boundaries between social groups, it contributed to a more fragmented America”
(Cohen, 331).

“events no longer have meaning: it is not that they are insignificant in themselves, it is that they
are preceded by the model, with which their processes only coincided” (Baudrillard, 56).
Baudrillard also warns of a critical inversion in which we become the objects of the commodities
rather than the commodities being our objects. He writes:
people go there [the mall or “hypermarket”] to find and to select
objects-responses to all the questions they may ask themselves;
or, rather, they themselves come in response to the functional and
directed question that the objects constitute. The objects are no
longer commodities: they are no longer even signs whose
meaning and message one could decipher and appropriate for
oneself, they are tests, they are the ones that interrogate us, and
we are summoned to answer them, and the answer is included
in the question. Thus all the messages in the media function in a
similar fashion: neither information nor communication, but
referendum, perpectual test, circular response, verification of the
code. (Baudrillard, 75)
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One might imagine that market segmentation at least leads to distinct
consumer communities. And we might conclude that some community is better
than none. Certainly there are those in the Harley-Davidson community or the
Star Trek (Trekkers) community, but these are more exceptions than the rule.
Such communities entail a kind of lifestyle that accompanies the consumer
product in a way that most consumer products do not (though certainly
advertisers, whether for the Gap or Coca-Cola, try to convince us that their
products are lifestyle choices). And I would go further. By appealing to
individual needs or wants and emphasizing consumer choice, market
segmentation contributes to the prevalence of naked selves. You join your
consumer community and remain with it as long as it brings you enjoyment and
makes you feel good. When it no longer does that, you move on to another
consumer product and join a new community. This mentality translates poorly to
our natural communities of neighborhoods, school districts, and towns—places
where we need to be able to work with one another to resolve conflicts and
figure out solutions to local problems, where conflicts and problems can appear
intractable and our continued efforts depend on our acting as citizens and not
consumers. No wonder we increasingly find ourselves shut up in our homes
with curtains drawn, our windows to the world and each other restricted to
computer monitors and television screens. For his part, Zizek describes us as
monads. He asks, “Are we not more and more monads with no direct windows
onto reality, interacting alone with the PC screen, encountering only the virtual
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simulacra, and yet immersed more than ever in the global network,
synchronously communicating with the entire globe?” (Zizek, On Belief, 26).6
Many scholars argue that popular culture is a creator of community rather
than a hindrance to it. Take the example of Trekkers, as pop culture guru Henry
Jenkins has done. Is this a genuine community, like those we might associate
with towns, churches, or civic organizations? Businesses and corporations,
through market segmentation, bring very different people together into
communities revolving around consumer products. But these communities have
identity only to the degree that individuals purchase and enjoy those products.
Any individual can move in or out of that community based on personal
preference and financial resources. Such communities do not tackle local
problems or generate long-lasting commitments to the community. Remember,
commodities are only mediators of social relationships. The commodities of
popular culture ultimately obfuscate these relationships. Thus, the genuine
community that can arise from social relationships is missing in popular culture.
Defining community or distinguishing between kinds of communities, however,
is difficult. I think this is reflected in one of Jenkins’ most influential essays, “Star
Trek Rerun, Reread, Rewritten: Fan Writing as Textual Poaching.” In the essay he
slips from using scare quotes around the word community to not using scare

Or, as Guy Debord concludes, “Spectators [or we can say, consumers] are linked solely by their
one-way relationship to the very centre that keeps them isolated from each other. The spectacle
thus reunites the separated, but it reunites them only in their separateness” (Debord, 16).

6
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quotes. I think this suggests his own ambivalence about these consumer
communities and the naked selves of which they are constituted.7
As I have suggested the proliferation of naked selves described in this
paper, the popular culture selves, poses some negative consequences for social
and political life. The consumer of popular culture is an isolated individual.
There is nothing that binds the consumer with his or her fellow citizens other
than the act of consumption. There are no common traditions or codes of
conduct. Of course, many consumers share a particular product of popular
culture in common. Harley Davidson motorcycle owners form a community of
sorts, as do (we might suppose) Starbucks coffee drinkers or fans of the television
series Lost. But even here we fail to reach any level of political critical mass. We
do not have political community. (Again, I suspect there are exceptions that
prove the rule.) We have groupings as a consequence of market segmentation.
And as Cohen notes, the market segmentation of consumer culture has long since
made its way into the political arena. In other words, not only are consumers
I would argue that we need to distinguish at least three types of consumer-based
communities associated with popular culture. Product-centered communities revolve around
specific consumer commodities, such as people who wear clothing from the Gap or choose Mac
versus PC. Lifestyle-centered communities involve a commodity, but include particular
behaviors and attitudes that shape a person's life. For example, those people who own a HarleyDavidson are not just owning a motorcycle but choosing a particular lifestyle. Finally, there are
religio-locale-centered-communities. An example of this type of community is a college football
community, and I am thinking particularly of those in the American South. Such communities,
while certainly within popular culture and sharing some characteristics with the other types, are
different from product-centered or lifestyle-centered communities. In particular they are different
because they have a sense of place (a locale) and function in religious or pseudo-religious ways.
As a consequence, they achieve a greater sense of community and thus become distinct from
other consumer-based communities (though threatened by the same factors that function
perniciously in those other types).
7
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divided through market segmentation, but citizens are divided as well—into
liberals and conservatives, the religious and non-religious, gay rights advocates
and their opponents, and, of course, Pro-Choices and Pro-Lifers. In such a public
square, politicians rarely focus on the common good. They focus on the goods of
constituencies instead.8 Cohen concludes that “just as segmented buyers of goods
seek the best match for their distinctive tastes and desires with what is available
in the commercial marketplace, so segmented citizens have similarly come to
expect the political marketplace—consisting of candidates, government agencies,
and PACs—to respond to their needs and interests narrowly construed” (Cohen,
343). In short, citizens—full citizens, clothed in the familiarity of community,
history, and tradition—have been turned into naked consumers.
The ways that popular culture exploits and encourages naked selves is
pretty depressing.9 This sense of foreboding gets worse when we begin to
consider the social and political consequences. One might wonder if there is any
hope for our future. Adorno perhaps foresaw this predicament when he wrote:

Cohen observes that rather than “try to convince voters of some common good, as Roosevelt,
Truman, and Eisenhower all struggled to do—from FDR’s Four Freedoms to Ike’s prime-time
‘Eisenhower Answers America’—more recent presidential candidates, as well as many running
for lower office, at best construct a composite vision out of the specialized interests of their
distinct constituencies, and at worst avoid discussing any common good at all” (Cohen, 342).
9 Admittedly, one’s community, history, and tradition can be limiting if not downright
oppressive—especially if you are, for example, homosexual or bisexual. In this sense,
“clothedness” can be a psychologically harmful experience and it would be much better to be
naked. But I do not think this needs to be a stark either/or choice—either the comfortable (for the
majority) “clothedness” of community, history, and tradition that leads to the marginalization or
even persecution of minorities or the liberating “nakedness” represented in (among other places)
popular culture.
8
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The neon signs which hang over our cities and
outshine the natural light of the night with their own
are comets presaging the natural disaster of society,
its frozen death. Yet they do not come from the sky.
They are controlled from earth. It depends upon
human beings themselves whether they will
extinguish these lights and awake from a nightmare
which only threatens to become actual as long as men
believe in it. (Adorno, 96)10
If this “nightmare” can be avoided or, in a more dire sense, if we can wake up
from the “nightmare” we already have begun dreaming, it is going to take a reorientation of our perspective to our popular culture. It is going to take a
renewed affirmation of the “fully clothed” self—the self intricately bound in a
web of community, history, and tradition.
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